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Civil Action No. 84-3040 
(GAG) 
_______ ___________ ) 
MOTION TO FILE 
SUPPLEMENT TO DEFENDANT'S 
POST-TRIAL BRIEF AND SUPPLEMENT 
TO DEFENDANT'S POST-TRIAL BRIEF 
Defendant Price Waterhouse hereby moves this Court for 
an order permitting it to file the attached Supplement to 
Defendant's Post-Trial Brief. 
1. Since defendant filed its Post-Trial Brief on 
April 20, 1990, it has learned of the Third Circuit's April 3, 
1990 decision in Rickel v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
No. 89-1529, slip op. (April 3, 1990). In Rickel, the Third 
Circuit held that monetary awards under the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act ("ADEA") do not constitute taxable income for 
purposes of federal law. 
2. The reasoning and logic of the Rickel decision 
are equally applicable to monetary awards under Title VII. To 
defendant's knowledge, Rickel is the first clear and 
authoratative decision of a Federal Court of Appeals to hold 




3. Plaintiff has assumed in her arguments to this 
Court that she will be required to pay taxes on any award in 
this case and has not reduced her calculations of alleged 
damages to adjust for the fact that any recovery she may 
receive would be tax-free. While defendant has argued that 
plaintiff is not entitled to any damages in this case, the 
Third Circuit's decision in Rickel demonstrates that 
plaintiff's recovery, if any, would not be taxable. Thus, 
application of the reasoning of the Rickel decision would have 
a significant impact on the amount of any award to plaintiff in 
this case. 
WHEREFORE, defendant requests permission to bring the 
Rickel decision to the attention of the Court by filing the 
attached Supplement to its Post-Trial Brief. 
A proposed order is also filed with this Motion. 
DATED: May 2, 1990 
Of Counsel: 
Wayne A. Schrader 
(D.C. Bar No. 361111) 
Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. 
(D.C. Bar No. 420440) 
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER 
1050 Connecticut Ave., N.W. 
Suite 900 




Ulric R. Sullivan 
Assistant General 
PRICE WATERHOUSE 
1251 Avenue of the 








Theodore B. Olson . 
(D.C. Bar No. 367456) 
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER 
1050 Connecticut Ave., N. w. 
Suite 900 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
(202) 955-8500 
\ 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 














Civil Action No. 84-3040 
(GAG) 
__________________ ) 
SUPPLEMENT TO DEFENDANT'S 
POST-TRIAL BRIEF 
This memorandum is being filed to bring to the Court's 
attention the April 3, 1990 decision of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Rickel v. Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, No. 89-1529, slip op. (3d Cir. Apr. 3, 1990) 
(a copy of the slip opinion is attached hereto for the 
convenience of the Court), in which the Third Circuit held that 
monetary awards under tli'e.. Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
("ADEA") do not constitute taxable income for purposes of 
federal law. Because ~ e re_asoning and logic of the Rickel 
~ 
decision are equally applic~ble to Title VII back pay and front 
pay awards, the decision is directly relevant to this case. 
In Rickel, the Third Circuit reviewed prior decisions 
of that Court and decisions of other Courts of Appealsl/ that 
would have suggested that back pay awards under ADEA and 
l/ Defendant is not aware of any decisions of the Court of 
Appeals for this Circuit expressly addressing this issue. 
• 
Title VII would be taxable. Slip op. at 19. It considered 
those decisions in the context of the relevant provisions of 
the Internal Revenue Code and the distinctions between various 
types of recoveries as to their includability as income for tax 
purposes. The Court held that awards of back pay in 
discrimination suits are not subject to taxation because such 
awards are excludable from gross income under 26 U.S.C. 
§ 104(a)(2), which provides that "gross income does not 
include . the amount of any damages received . on 
account of personal injuries or sickness . Id. at 5-6. 
The Court determined that the critical inquiry under this 
provision is whether damages are paid "on account of 'personal 
injuries"' (id. at 6) and reasoned that suits brought under 
federal anti-discrimination laws like ADEA, and Title VII,l/ 
are "analogous to the assertion of a tort type right to redress 
a personal injury" and therefore damages paid under these 
federal statutes are excludable from gross income under 
§ 104(a) (2). Slip op. at 18. 
Although plaintiff in this case has repeatedly 
d h 1 . t f 1 . . . 31 h h compare er c aim o one or persona 1nJur1es,- s e as 
II As evidence of the "personal injury" quality of 
discrimination suits, the Court quoted Justice O'Connor's 
concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 s. Ct. 
1775, 1798 (1989), in which she described Title VII as creating 
a "statutory employment 'tort.'" Slip op. at 19 n. 14. 
~/ See,~, Pl. Pre-Trial Reply Br. on Remedy, at 8 (Jan. 
24, 1990). Indeed, plaintiff has argued, incorrectly, that she 
suffered some form of permanent disability as a result of Price 
Waterhouse's decision to defer her partnership candidacy for 
one year. See Def. Post-Trial Br. On Remedial Issues at 37. 
- 2 -
assumed in her arguments to this Court that she "will have to 
pay income taxes on any award made to her by the Court." Pl. 
Ex . A3; 1990 Tr. at 119-20, 140-41. Thus, for example, 
plaintiff seeks back pay for the fiscal year 1983-84 in the 
amount of $107,156 (less "actual earnings'' for the same 
period). This figure is based on the average gross before-tax 
ear~ings of a class of 1983 Price Waterhouse partner for that 
period. See 1990 Tr. at 140. 
Assuming for the sake of example that such an award 
was taxed at a rate of 28%, see 1990 Tr. at 119, plaintiff's 
claimed net award would be $77,152.32 and, when augmented by 
interest at the appropriate rate, would theoretically put 
plaintiff in the same position as a Price Waterhouse partner 
who actually earned, and paid taxes (in 1984 at a rate 
considerably higher than 28%), on gross earnings of $107,156. 
Therefore, under Rickel, to award plaintiff $107,156, tax 
free, plus interest, in back pay for one year would constitute 
a completely unwarranted windfall that would put her in a far 
better position than the Price Waterhouse partner with whom she 
compares herself. 
If the Court finds liability, plaintiff's monetary 
recovery in this case, if any, must be reduced to an 
- 3 -
approximate net after-tax equivalent. See,~' Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Coro . v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523 (1983); Norfolk 
and Western R . Co. v. Lieoelt, 444 U. S. 490 (1980) . 
DATED: May 2, 1990 
Of Counsel: 
Wayne A. Schrader 
(D.C. Bar No. 361111) 
Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. 
(D.C . Bar No. 420440) 
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER 
1050 Connecticut Ave., N.W. 
Suite 900 




Ulric R. Sullivan 
Assistant General Counsel 
PRICE WATERHOUSE 
1251 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10020 
(212) 489-8900 
Respectfully submitted, 
~~ eodore B. Olson 
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(D.C. Bar No. 367456) 
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER 
1050 Connecticut Ave., N. w. 
Suite 900 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
(202) 955-8500 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 


















Defendant's Motion to File Supplement to Defendant's 
Post-Trial Brief is hereby GRANTED. 
Dated: 
To be notified upon entry: 
James H. Heller 
KATOR, SCOTT & HELLER 
1275 K Street, N.W. 
Suite 950 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
Theodore B. Olson 
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER 
1050 Connecticut Ave., N.W. 
Suite 900 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
United States District Judge 
/ 
( 
F1led April 3. 1990 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
No. 89-1529 
FRANK E. & MILDRED E. RICKEL. 
Appellants 
vs. 
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 
On Appeal from the United State9 Tax Court 
(No. 22936-87) 
Argued January 22. 1990 
Before: SLOVlTER, HUTCHINSON and COWEN 
Ctrcuit Judges 
(F1led Apr11 3. 1990) 
DIXON R. RICH (ARCUED) 
DIXON R. RICH. JR. 
Rtch. Fluke, Ttshman & Rich 
220 Two Chatham Center 
Ptttsburgh, PA 15219 
Attorneys for the Appellants 
SHIRLEY D. PETERSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
··--· ...... .,.... . _ ...... ~--..-.--•-·----····· .. ·- . . 
., 
.. 





















GARY R ALLEN 
ANN BELANGl-.:R DURNEY 
URUCE R. ELLJSEN (ARGUED) 
J\ttomt"'r-1 
U.!:>. hevaitmcnl oi Jm,Ht.'t'. 
Post Office Box 502 
Washington~ 0£'. 2~ · - . , · 
Attorneys for the Appdlee 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
COWEN. Cfreutt Judge. 
The appellant Frank E. Rickel ("the taxpayer-)' 
received $80,000 from his former employer in 1983 
and S2S.OOO in 1984 pursuant to a settJement of h1s 
A~c Dlscrtmlnatlon In Employment Act ( .. ADEA .. ) 
lawsuit. Thts appeal requlns us to decide whether the 
lJnUed Stales Tax Court properly determined lhat 
one-half of this settlement represented taxable tn(X)me. 
Because we conclude that the entire settlement 
amount is excludable under 26 U.S.C. § 104(at(2)1• we 
will reverse the order of the Tax Court. 
I. 
The relevant facts of lhls case are not contested. 
The taxpayer was employed by Ma)sbary 
--------------
I. Mlltln-d E . Ri<'kd appl'ars lo~ a party solrly hct:au~ she signed lhc.- joinl lm-omc lax mums whtrh are tn dispute in thl-. clppt"a.1. 
2. Whih- 11 2 of the Tax lklom1 Ad of H~ r('d<'Sij!rtalro the lnlt"Tnal Rn,cnur Cock of 1954 as lhc Internal Revt:nur Code of 
l986. 1hr lax.able ~ars and lhl- sli,,ifln.nt undrrlyin~ rw::nts In 
lhL-. casr artlrdalr the 1986 A<'I. Tbrrt"fon-. unlc-.::. otht"JWisc O(llf'd. 




Manufactunng Company rMalsbary .. ). Uniontown. 
~nnsytvanla. as a general sales ~r. In March 1979. when the taJrpayer waa 58 )"NI'S old, the position of prr:strl~nt ~ned up at the C'Offlp:my_ Of-snttr ft11• 
company ornctals that the taxpayer would be ronsideR!d tor the post, th¢ c:oinpanJ hired a much 
younge{ lJldlyl~ .a,1 ff:Ol~t · . · .. '. · · , , . ·"·-, Subsequently. dte rtew president told the taxpayt:t-
lhat he wanted soJOeODe younger fol' the position of 
general sales manager. The taxpayer was the.-cafttt 
relieved or his position In faYOr of a 37 year old 
lndlvldual. placed on partial pay. and eventually 
discharged on Dtttmber 31. 19?9. 
Mtn- recetvtng a rtght to sue letter from Che EEOC, 
the taxpayer brought suit In fcderaJ court against Malsbary and Its parent. Carllsle Corporation rearuste .. ). alkglng a vtolatto6 of the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. 
IHI 621-634 ( I 982t. The taxpayer·s amended complaint contained the ro11ow1ng prayers n rdld: 
A. Order defendants Jolntly and/or sevttaJly to 
rmpioy the plalntlff aa Praklalt el MalehPty; or In 
tire alternative to mnstate plalntlff to his formec or 
a comparable posltto~ 
0. Orocr the defendants jolntlJ and/or severally to 
pay back wages. bmdlt.s and othff compensaUons 
found by lhe Court to be due plalntlff, together 
with Interest thereon from the date when such 
amount became due; 
C. Grant a Judgment ttqulrlng ddendants Jointly 
and/or scwrally to pay appropnate back wages and 
an equal sum as llquldated damages. to pJalnUff 
who has bttn adversely affectffl by the unlawful 
employment practtca descdbed herein: 
D: Award counsel for plalntlff reasomib.le' 
attorneys fttS and expenses; · 
• 

















E. J\wanl any ru.-ther r-eUef which is appropriate 
and proper under the cln:um.c;tances. 
App. at 5B-59. 
The lax1•ayer·s acuon was tried before a jury in a 
bifurcated trial. The Jury first h~rd evidence on the 
Issue of liability. After the testimony. four 
Interrogatories were submitted lo the jury for their 
consideration: 
( I J Was plaintiff ... qualified in April 1979 for 
the posmon of President of Malsbary ... ? 
(2) Wa.<1 age a determinative factor tn the decision 
not to promote the plai null? 
(3J Was plaintiff ... qualified In August 1979 for 
the position of General Sales Manager of Malsbary 
... 7 
(4) Was~ a ddenninaUve factor in the decision 
to discha~ the plaintiff from his job as General 
Sales Manager? 
App. at 86. 
While the jury was deliberating. the parlies 
reached a settlement. The specific terms of the 
settlement dcpend~I upon the jury's answers lo lhe 
Interrogatories. When the jury answered all the 
questions affirmatively. the dc£cndanls were obligated 
to pay the taxp,_"lycr $80,000 Immediately and $25.000 
during each of the next four years. TI1c settlement 
a~rcement did not allncaCe the settkment amount 
among the taxpayer·s various prayers for relief. 
Car-lisle made the flrst payment of $80.000 in 
1983, and paid $25.000 during eac:h of the sucettdtng 
four years. 3 Only the receipt of $80.000 In 198.1 and 
$25.000 in 1984 are at Issue in this appeal. Carlisle did 
not withhold Federal im·o,pc or S<x-ial Security tax 
------;;---·• -· - ....... -.·,. . --
' 3 . Mal-.ban- \\"("Jlt oul or ~J1l'Slnrss iu lHf!t.i. 
. ' 
I · _., 
5 
from any or the payments. The taxpayer neither 
reported the $80,000 or the 825.000 as gross income 
nor dlsdoeed these amounts on bis 1983 and 1984 tax 
returns. 
In a statutory notice of defklency. the 
Commissioner of tbe Internal Revenue 
f'Commf9slontt'l determined .tbat the entire amount 
of $105.000 was tanhle 11¢me. 1be Commls.91oner 
argued that the 9ettlement proott,ds .represented either 
back pay or punltlYe damages. both of which the 
Commissioner awrted wine taxable Items or Income. 
The taxpayer peUUoned the Tax Court attklng a 
redctennlnauon or the deftctency. 
After a trial. the Tu: Court found that one-half. t.e. 
$40,000 In 1983 and $12.500 ln 1984. or the 
settlement was laDble Income. TIie Court found that 
the other half or the settlement was excludable under 
§ 104(a)(2)~ In addlUon. the Tax Court alao denied the 
taxpayer's motion l'or reasnoable litigation costs. This 
appeal followed. We haYc Jur19dtctlon ova- taxpayer·s 
appeal pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 11 7482(a). 
JI. 
The Internal Revenue Code f"IRC7 states that 
.. lelxcept as otbenrlee provided ..•• gl'09S income 
means an tncome from what~ aourtt derived ...... 
26 U.S.C. ti 61 (a,. Accordtngly. any acttMlon to wullh 
is prcsl.lDH!d to be gross Income. unless the taxpayer 
can demonstrate that the acttSSlon Rts Into one of the 
specific cxcJuslons created by other sections of the IRC. 
Commtssfone,- v. G~nshow Glass Co .• 348 U.S. 426. 
429-30 (1955). 
The exclusion at Issue here IS I 104(a)(2) which 
reads in relevant part: -gross Income does not include 
... the amount of any damages retttved (whether by 
suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or ~5 
periodic paymenlsJ on account of~ tnju~6s or 
j . 


















sickness ... . ""' Sfnrc the appropriate fJIICSt ion lo ask 
for- purposes of§ 104(a)(2) is whether the damages 
wer-c received on accounl of personal injuries. 
1'hrelkeld v. Commtssfoner. 87 T.C. 1294. 1305 
(1987), aj]"d, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. J988t (fuH Tax 
Court). ft Is important to determine e.xartJy what the 
tenn -personal injurtes" means for the purposes of the 
IRC. 
Unfortunately. neither the statute. Treasury 
regulations nor leglslattve history prnvtdes much 
guidance. Id. However, it is judicially weU-est.ablishcd 
that the Dlf> ... •mtng of "'personal inju~·· In this context 
encompasses both nonphysical as well as physic.al 
lnjurl(S. Be11t o. Commissfolfer. 835 l-".2d 67. 70 (3d 
Cir. 1987): Roemer o. Commisstoner, 716 F.2d 693. 
697 (9th Ctr. 1983J; Threlkeld. 87 T.C. at 1297: Seay 
v. Commissioner. 58 T.C. 32. 40 ( l 972f. See 
generally. lh Frolik. Federal Tax Aspects qf lryury. 
Damage. and Loss 59 0 987). ln addition. the 
Treasu.ry regulations narrow the scope or exdudablc 
.. damages·· to "an amount received . .. through 
prosc~cuUon of a l~I suit or action based upon tort or 
lort type righls;. or lhrough a settlement a~rttment 
entered lnlo in Ueu of such prosecution.·· 26 C.1-·.R. 
!l J. I 04- I (c) ( 1989). See generally Tluf?lkrld, 87 T.C. 
at. 1297. Thus, "ILJhc cssenttal element of an exclusion 
under section I 01(a)(21 Is that the income Involved 
must. derive from some sort of tort claim ,i~atnst the 
payor:· Glynn v. Commissioner. 76 T.C. 116. J 19 
( 1981 ). <Y]'d wtthout published opinion. 676 F.2d 682 
( Isl Cir-. 1982). See also Byrne v. Commissioner. 883 
F.2d 21 I. 2J1 (3d Cir. 1989) ( .. As dt>finetl by the 
r-elev~nt rc~t1la t ion. personal Injury _ cla I ms _ assert 
1 . The Tm.: Court has gi\"cn 1hr lenn .. on a<Tonnt or In J 
I 041al(2) ils <-ommon meaning of ··1or the sake of. - -hy reason or.·· 
or .. bt-t-a1~ of.·· .Milin 11. Commi1,sio~e.-. 9.1_ T.C. 3.]0. 3:J9 I ?9691 
. (explaining that an tnlt"l"JlVf;."lton of 1hr langua_l!c "'quiriiig more 






vlolatlons of ·tort or tort type rtgbts' .. t. Accord 
Threlkeld. 87 T.C. at 1305. 
Consequently. the Tax Court has long held that 
'ltJf a taxpayer recdfts a damage award for a physical 
Injury. which almost by ddlnlttcn IS personal. the 
entire award ls excluded from Income (umkr 
n 104(a)(2H even If aU or part of the recovery ts 
determined with reference to the Income lost because 
or the Injury.·· Threlkeld. 87 T.C. at 1300. The 
compensation Is exempt whether paid for earnings lost 
pnor to the award or settlement. or for espected future 
earnings. Frollk. supra lype9cr1pt p. 6. at 9. A8 one 
commentator has explalned: 
Id. 
Compensation Un the physlall tnJury context) 
for loss of earnings fS exdudable cwn though the 
lost earnin~ would have bttn taxable If earned. 
Suppose. for example. that a taxpayer Is torttousty 
Injured. sues. and settles rm 85.000. which ts 
allocated S l .000 for patn and suffmng. 82.000 for 
medical expenses. and $2.000 for wages lost prior 
to the scll~mcnt. Under 8 l04(a)(2), the entire 
$5,000 ls tax Cfflllpt. or (.•01.m,e. if the taxpa~r 
had not bttn Injured and had actually earned the 
$2.000 in wages. that money would have 
represented an addition to gross Income. Injured 
tax~s .-ho recover lost earnings arc better off. 
f n terms of taxes. than they would have been tr they 
had not bttn Injured. 
However. the Tax Court has long treated claims for 
nonphysical personal Injuries quite dJITerently. In the 
nonphysical Injury rontext., before dectdtng the tax 
con~uences of an award or sdtlement. the Tax Court 
has mounted an tnttlal Inquiry to determine wheU1er 
eat:h ·of the components or ilic ln.JUIY are. personal or 
nonpcrsonal. Threlkeld. 87 T.C. at 1300. For example. 


















injury arc for mentaJ or physical strain or personal 
crnbarras...c;ment, lhcn that portion of the rccow-ry ls 
excJudahle; yet if some of the dam~ arc recovettd for 
economic or profes.c;jonal los..-.es. e.g .. back pay or lost 
Jrtc'lme. then that portion of the recovery ts taxable 
Income. See. e .g .• Coats 11. Commisslone,-, 36 T.C.M. 
fCCI-U 1650 ( 1977): llodge v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 
616 ( 1975). See generally FroUk. supm typescript p. 6, 
at 60-~2. 
The different treatment of physical and 
nonphysical (K:rsonal lnJurtes has sometimes led to 
tor·tured analyseR and arbitrary results. Finally. in 
Roemer v. Commissioner. 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 
1983). the Court of AJ•('M".als for lhc Ninth Circuit 
rejected this dual approach. ln Roemer, the taxpayer. a 
successful independent insurance agent brought a 
defamation suit against a credit agrncy which had 
misrepresented his credit history to various Insurance 
companies. Id. at 695. Mtcr- a triaJ in which the Jury 
was lold that the taxpaye.- had lost S 135.000 in 
pmspectlve income as a rr..sult of the defamation, the 
jury awarded him $40.000 In compensatory damages. 
Id. The taxpayer did not report the entire amount of 
the awanl as gross Income and the CommissJonc.-
issued a notice of deficiency. Id. 
The Tax Court determined that the taxpayer had 
not pruven that the damages were Jn compensation for 
personal losses. e.g .. personal embarrassment or 
damage to his personal reputation. rather than injury 
to the taxpayer's business or professional reputaUon. 
i.e . . efX>nomic loss. and lhcrefore the en lire amount 
was faxable. Id. The Roem,~,- court disa~reed. noung 
that the only distincUon found in ij 104(aH2) was 
between personal and nonpcrsonal htjur-ics, not 
physical and nonphysical injuries. Id. at 697. The 
court explained further lh:!t~ 
' 
Thie taxpayl'T·s, i~j(Jry ... should not be ronfused 
with the derivative consequences of the 
1-· 
9 
defamatory attack, I.e.. the loss of reputation in 
the community and any ~Ing k>98 of lmome. 
The nonpcrsonal consequences of a personal 
Injury. such as a loss of future Income. arc often 
the most persuaslft means of pnwtng lM ctlent of 
the Injury that was suffered.. The pereonal nature 
or an Injury sboukl not be deftned by lt.s effect . 
Id. at 699. Since defamation was a penional Injury 
under Callfomla law. the court held that all the 
compensatory damages tteetwd by the taxpayer as a 
result of the lnjmy wa-e "exdudabw from gross lneome 
un<k.- 9 104(a)(2). as would be the compensatory 
damages tttttvrd on aocount of all)' paww tnjury. ·· 
Id. at 700 . 
Aft.a Roemer was deckkd the fu9 Tax Court, In 
Threlkeld v. Commtssfoner. 87 T.C. 1294 ( 1987). 
aj]'d. 848 F.2d 81 (6th Ctr. 1988). ac~ptccl the 
reasoning of the Ninth Circuit In a 15- l vole. 
Conceding that their differing treatment of physical 
and nonphystral lnjurtes In the peat WM .. analytically 
lrn:a>ncllable," fd., at 1301. the Tax Court held that: 
The Court of Appmls Un Roenaer-1 viewed the 
problftn of recoveries for defamation rrom the 
propu perspective. Section 104(a)(2) excludes 
from Income amounts r-ecetffd as damages on 
acoount of paeonal Injuries. Tbemore, 1vhether 
the damages recefPed are paid on aaount qi 
.. personal l,Uwies .. should be the l>egtnnfng and 
the end ~ the tnqutry. To ddcnnloe whethtt the 
injury complained of Is personal. we must look to 
the origin and character or the claim. and not lo 
the constttuences that result rrom the Inquiry. 
Id. al 1299 (citations omfltroJ (emphasis added). 
Admitting that the question of interpretation 
presented by the language of 8 104(a)(2) presents 
.. con~eptual challenges .. and that f~ustng on ,the 
. ' . I 
' ' 
IO 
natur~ of the taxpayer·s injury .-aq1er than ihc consequences flowing from H will be diflkull. the Tax Court explained however that; 
this lapproa<"h) is no more difficult in most c.ases than Che type of Inquiry previously required~ the llne of cases. culmlnallng In I the Tax Court dC'clsion In) Roemer, which distinguished the nature of the consequences resulting from a claim. t·urthermore. the approach that we will now apply in all cases. whether the Injury dalmed Is personal. more accurately renects the Inquiry required by the plain meaning of the statute. Exclusion under secUon I 04 wlJJ be appropriate If compensatory damages are received on account of any Invasion of the I ights that an individual Is granted by vtrtue of being a person In the sight of the law. 
Threlkeld. 87 T.C. at 1308 (footnote omilled).5 





In Bent u. q>mmfsstoner .. 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir1 l 987J. this Court also ad.opted the unlfkd approach of the Ninth Clreutt. and applied It to an action brought under 42 U.S.C. I 1983 (1982). In Bott. a teacher claimed he had been dented re-cmploJmaat for reasons which abridged his Oral amendment rights. Id. at 69. The school settled and the teacher rttelw:d a sum basffl on his lost wagr.s. Id.. at 70. lb.ls Court rejttted the Commissioners argument that since there was 110 pain and suffering shown ln the case. merely an economic loss TfflUIUng from the discharge, the suit was in reality one for lost wages not penionaJ Injuries. Id. Focusing lnstt:ad on the nature of ~ claJm, we explained that a dcnlal of a ctvd right such as free speech lnvolw!s a personal lnjwy just as much as a physical assault. and. citing Roemer. held that as a result the whole of the taxpayer's damages were excludable under I I 04(a)(2) bttause -any economic lnjur-y proximately resulUng, such as 1088 of wages ... may be compensated for In an award of damagr..s for the personal lnjurks lnvolwd ... :· Id.. at 71.1 See also 
~ agr-.:cd with the PtstfHo Cow1·11 chandalzal1on ol the ruu Tax court·s holdJng 1n n.mbld. u does not IIUIVlw our holding 1n Dgm~ u. Contmtsstoner. 883 F.2d 211 (3d Cir'. 1989}. See alw Wulf u. CUy f1ff Wlchlfa, 883 F.2d M2, 872 (10th Cir'. 1989). 
6. Arter Bent was dec1dcd, the Oam1 of Afllx'.ala r.- the Sixth Circuit affirmc:d 1hr preYIOllsly d1Ktlll9'ICI Tu: Oourt decision tn TltmJcefd: 















Wulf v. City Qf Wichfla, 883 F.2d 842. 872-73 {10th Cir. l 989) (holding that an award o( damages spcdftcally allocated to back pay as a result of a wrongful discharge tn vtolatlon of flrst amendment rights under § 1983 was nontaxable under !I l04(a)(2)). 
RccentJy. this Court extended the analysis of Roemer and Bent both lo a retaliatory discharge claim under the Fair Labor Standards Acl r·FLSA"t and a wrongful discharge claim under stale Jaw. IJyme u. Commlsst.oner. 883 F.2d 211 (3d Ctr. 1989). The taxpayer in Byrne claimed that she was treated dlscrtmtnatorily by her employer because she had cooperated with an EEOC lnvesttgatton of wage disparity al her workplace. Id. at 212. t·onowtng Roemer and Bent. we held that b«.ause a dalm under the FL5A"s antidtscrlmlnaUon provtston
7
• as well as a claim under New Jersey's wrongrul discha'l~ laws. was the assntion of a persona] injury. tort or tort type right. r.ither than an economic rtghl arisini out of a contract. the taxpaye..-·s enUre settlement award was ex.cludable from gross Income. Therefore. we rcjccled 
•· 
the Commtssione..-·s argument ... that the settlement is taxable because lt was intended. at ·- ---· -~n thoUJ1'1 It affr.ctcd his vrorcssk>nal pursuits. .l\ll Income in ~-ompn1sal Ion of that injury L .. cx£1udablc undo sc."Clion J04taK2t. 
Threlkeld 11. Commissiom'T. 848 F.2d 81. 8416th Cir. 19881. 
7 . SN.·lion 215tall31 of the tl.SI\ 5\atcs \hat it shaD be unlawful for any pa-son 




least In part. to oompmsate lthe taxpayerl for lost wagffl due to her wrongful firing. The relevant inquiry. as the Tax Court noted. Is whether the settlement was tteel¥ed on account of pttSOnal or non-personal lnjurtes. not whethtt the damages «.'Ompensate the taxpayer for economic losses. To the extent that the Commissioner argu~ that because the setUement was Intended to compensate I the taxpayttl for economic los."ICS tt Is therefore compensating her for non-persona] injuries. we find this argument to have been ex:plldtly rejected lo Beru. and we reject U agatn · here. 
Id. at 214. 
We are asked now to extend Byrne to a different type of dlscrtmlnatJon claim. l.e. age dlscnmination. 1·he Tax Court tn the Instant C&M ooncluded lhat half of lhe taxpaycr·s settlement was taxable Income and that half was excludablc under II 104(a)(2). In lts opinion. the Tax Court found that the taxpayer·s ADEA suit consisted of cla1ms for both wage-related damages and llquldatcd damages. Rickel v. Commission.er. 92 T.C. 510. 522 0989). Noting that the amount o( Jtqutdated damages ~e In an ADEA suit must be basal upon the amount of back pay awanled. the Court allocatro half of the settlement to each type of dama~ claim. Id. The Court tbUI held that .. damages In Uru of wages are In the natuff of a breach of contract actJon:· Id. at 521. whlle "ltquldated damages are intended as compensatlon fora tort or tort-like injury:· id. Therefore. only the latter damages were excludable from gross Income under- sect.Ion 104(a)l2).8 





' · I 
I 
14 
Th~ taxpayer argues that the Tax C'.ourt erred In findlilg that the taxpayer·s ADE.A action consislNI of orie-half pnsonal Injury. tort type claims and one-haJf . nonpersonal Injury, contract type claims. He argu~ that umk.- our dtttston In Byrne the entire settlrment amount should be excludabk as rompen..~tton for a peC"sonaJ injury. We agree and find that the Tax Court failed to properly apply the analysis adopted by this Court--and. indeed. the analysis the full Tax Court Itself has adopt~ In Threlkeld--to determine whether scttlem~nt procttds are exctudabfe from gross income under§ 104(a)(2). 




·' . . ' , ; detennlne Ure n~tUR of hlS cl:aJm. the Tax Court war.; slmpty defining the nature or the ~·s Injury by reference to its nonpersonal consequences, an approach we exphdtly rtjecttd ln both Bent and Byrne. and the fuU Tax Court rejected In Threlkeld. As In Byrne. the nonpersonal. economic effects of the cmploye..-·s act of dl9crlmtnatlon. e.g.. loss of wages. does not transform a personal tort type claim Into one for nonpcrsonal Injuries. Byrne. 883 F.2d at 214.9 See also Roemer. 716 F.7.d at 699. . Furthermore, we are confident that the Tax court correctly characterized age discrimination as more analogous to a penooal lnjuiy tort than a breach of contract cla1m. We characterl:ad the taxpayer's action In Byrne. under the FLSA·s anUdlscrlmlnatlon prnvislon, as asserting a personal injury. tort type rtght ~u~: 
such a suit alleges the vlolaUon of a duty owed the ,plalntlffby the ddcndant cmplo)'a' which arises by operation of the Act. This duty Is lndq:,endcnt of . any duty an emplOJU might owe his employee pursuant to an apress 't>r llllplied employment contract; It arl9e8 by opmltlon o{ law. Thus. the statutory claim seeks to remedy a statutory violation that the law has ddloed as wrongful. 
9. Thus, to \be nlat that the Cuamwiaiaaer, in apeoclinc Ml inmdioately large put fl hiB brief atieJDpthia lo l!llllab1illb that at Jcast hair of the eettlemeat CJ01Dprised payment for 'hack pay. ia arguing that ''because the 9ett\eme11t was inlaMled t., compensate 1/Ahe taxpayet"/4 for llCIIIIIOlllic loue9 it is~ ciompmuaating 'n.himV. for non-penlOIUil u,Juries,, -find this argument. to have been rejected in Bent V..and B~V., ud we reject ~ again here" for the lh.ird tilll('!. ByrM. 883 F .?At at 214. 
! ' 
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Byrne. 883 F.2d at 215. 11 We believe that a similar 
analysts applies to a claim of age dfscrtmh1alion under 
lhc- ADEA. 
(,Ike the anlidi.sciimlnatlon provision of the Fl.SA. 
lhc <luty of an employer to refrain from dlscriminalb~ 
against employtts on the basis of their age arises by 
operation of a statute. Society has made the moral and 
('eonomic determlnaUon that as a matter of law il will 
not abide such dlscrlmtnatlon. Such a duty arises even 
in the absent.-e of a written employment contrdcl and 
despite the existence of either contrary terms in such a 
contract or conflicting common law rmploymcnt-al-will 
principles. 11 
Mo~r. ,ire do not bdleve that the Al>EA. and 
federal employment dtscrimJnaUon statutes In general. 
are usefully vtewed as a Congn:ssional attempt to 
,-ewrtte the terms of employment contracts. For one 
thing. nothing in the statutes suggests or hints al 
such an fnt~Uon. CJ. 42 U.S.C. 11 2000e-2 t I 982t 
(speaking In terms of "'unlawful anploymcnt practices 
for an empk,ycr7. But mon: Importantly the scope of 
these statutes goes beyond lhe mere 
employer-employee context. prot~ttng Individuals 
from various fonns of dJ9C11mioaUon even 1£ they are 
not yet In a contractual relatlonshlp. e.g.. refusal to 
10. Moreover. we also held In Bynte that a dtm:harge In 
vtolatk>n fl{ a dear mandale of publlc policy In New .Jc:rsey. t.~ .. 
against discr1m1natkm. involves the asseTUon of a claim for 
da~ for lnjwy of a pttSOnal nah.lft, ro.- pur~ of lhc JRC. 
rather lhan (oc- ttOnnltllr. loss. Id. at 216.. 
11. Llkewbc. the ADEA. In adopting from the fLSA the vc,y 
same rcmectlaJ pnnr1slons that Wffr: at Issue lo Oyme. provkks In 
50~ c~ fur ttqwdated da~ In an amount Ntual to the 
pla!nUff"s demonstrable compensatory damages. SUJlJ>Ol11~ the 
conduston that the' statutory remedy for age d;s.cr1m,nation costs 
to redress an act that the law dr.ftrus M ·wrongrul. - See H!Jmc. 88.1 




hire contexts. See_. e.g .. 29 U.,S e. § 623(a) (1982); 42 
U.S.C. § 2000fe)-2(al (1982•)Y 
We arc strengthened tn our conclusion by courts In 
other Jurisdlt:tlons that have characterized an action to 
redress discrimination tn the workplatt as a tort claim 
for ~rsonal injttrif:S whr.ther Che discrimination was 
based on race. see Goodman o. l,ukens Steel Co .• 482 
U.S. 656. I07 S. Cl. 2617, 2621 {1987t (describing 
§ 1981 or the Civil Rights laws as ··part of a federal law 
barring racial dlscrimlnaUon. which. as the Coun of 
Appeals lfor the Thlrd ClrcuUI said. Is a fundamental 
injury to the individual rights of a person-); Patterson 
v. Amerlron Tobacco Co .. 535 F.2d 2S7. 269 n.10 (4th 
Cir.). cert. denied. 429 U.S. 920 (1976t. sex. see 
Thompson r,. Commissioner. 866 F.2d 709. 712 (4th 
Cir. 1989); E.E.O.C. v. Vucitech. 842 F.2d 936. 944 
f7th Cir. 1988): Metzger r,_ Commlsstoner. 88 T.t.:. 
8.11. 851-52 (1987J. '!/fd without optnton. 845 F.2d 
1013 (3d Cir. 1988}. or age. see Jay r,_ InfemaUonal 
Salt Co., ~R F.2d 179. 180 (5th Ctr. 1989). CJ. Wtlson 
v. Garcia. 471 lLS. 261. 277 0985) fanaloglzlng a 
violation or the CMI Rights Acts of 1871 to a violation 
of the fourteenth amendment which -15 an Injury to the 
Individual rights of the person .. )~ Dtllon v. AFDIC 
Development Corp .• 597 F.2d 556. 562 (5th Cir. 1979) 
( .. An action ~ upon the federal antidiscrimlnatlon 
statutes ts csscnltally an action In tort7 (suit brought 
under the Fair Housing Act and the Civil Rights Act or 
1866•; TfHman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n. 
Inc .• 517 F.2d 114 l. 1143 {4th Cir. 1975) ('"an action 
brought under statutes forbidding racial 
dtsctiminallon Is fundamentally ror the ndress of a 
tort··1 (suit brought under various sections of the CMI 
Rights Acts of 1866 and 1964). Indeed. In dtclum. U1e 
Supr-eme Court has analogized an action to redress 
12. In addition. we ran nnd no ,i:ood ras.<10n to hold that the 
provisions or thr: ADEi\ arc implied rontr.11ctual lcnns. whlk 





djsc.-imtnallon. at least tn the context of race, lo defamation · or lntentlonal tofllctlon of e~oUonal dlstress clalms. Curtis v. Loefher, 415 U.S. 189. 195 n.10 (1974) (explalnlng that the .. conlour-s of the linlenttonal lnlllctlonJ tort are sttD developing. and it has been sug__~esled that 'under the logic or the common law development of a law of Insult and indignity, racial dtscrlmtnatlon might be treated as a dtgnlta,y tort: C. Gregory & H. Kalttn. Cases and Materials on Torts 961 (2d ed. 1969)7.u 
Thus. focusing on the nature of the claim. we arc convinced that the taxpayer·s dlscrlmlnation suit under the ADEA was analogous to the assertion of a tort type right to redress a personal Injury. By d.Jscrtmlnatlng against the taxpayer on the basis of his age. Malsbary Invaded the nghts thal the taxpayer .. is granted by vlrtue of being a person In the sight of Ute law.-Thretk.eld, 87 T.C. at 1308. The taxpayer merely sought the remedies affo.-ded by the s1atute as compensation for the personal Injury he suffered as a result or his employer·s act of dlsc.-lmlnalion; the nquestcd remedies/ w~re not separate claims ln themselves to ttdress the employer-'s breach of a 
13. We do not bdla-e that Rogel3 D. Exxon Rcsewcll & Engg C..o., 550 F.2.d 834 (3d Ctr. 1977), ce,t, dented, 434 U.S.. 1022 ( 19781. compels• dUJa'ent conduslon. Pl.rst. the Rogers court was characterizing •• ADEA action for purposes of detcrmtntng whethtt an ADEA plalnttfJ had the right lo a jury lrlal under the Act. not for tax p.u]XJ8CS- Id. at 838-39. Sttond. lhe conclusion by ~ Rogers c:ourt that an A.DEA ac:tlon ts a -rm.dine contract actton-was gratuitous g1wom that tJx: holdJng was simply that an ADE.A action lnvolws rights and n:mi,da or lM sort typically enforced in an actl<Jll at law. Id. And. thlnl, ~ do not hold today that there are no detnents In an ADEA acUon that do not possa;s c:ontra<.1 type rntutts. only thatagedtscrimlnation. forpurpoStSofl IM(a)(2)of , .. ·- • .. • ·· , , · ·.,·.:•' '"'.· •"'·' "''"'""/\OF.A ""tinn lo n'!lrrs;s th;,I 11~,uy 1s more Ilk( Uu: ~rt1c,n ol a tort. type 11~111. 
.. .. , 
19 
contr-<1r.t. •• The nonpcrsonl:'l consequ, nces of the · dtsulmination. · c .~ .. • lht: loss of wages, docs not t.-ansform discrimlnatlon Into a nonpersonal injury. Thercfo.-c. despite the contrary tax liabllHy assumptions that some courts. lncJudi11g this one. have made ln tcvi~ingjudgments obtained for ADEA 
violations, sec. e.g .• Gel~ v. Papineau, 829 F.2d. 452. 
455-56 (3d Ctr. 1987); Blfm " · Westem £!cc. C-0 .• 731 F.2d 1473, 1480( 10th Cir.}. cert. dented. ~9U.S. 874 ( 1984 t15• we hold that Just as ln the case of a physical personal Injury. all the damages rcctivcd by the taxpayer on account of age discrimination are excludablc under A I04(a)(2). 
We find some additional support for this view in the legisJattve history or Congress' recent amendment lo Ii I 04 (a )(2) in the 1989 Omn lb us Buct~C'C neconcilialion Act. 103 Stal. 2379 (1989). which added the prnvlslon that : -Paragraph (2) shall not 
14. As Jusfttt o·t:onnor explalned in the analofDus contl"lll or a Title VU aclloui 
Like the eommon law or torts. the statutory employnxnt "to.r created by Tltle Vil has two batnc purposes. The flrsl is to ckt« oonduct which has bttn klcntifled as mntrary to publk policy and harmful to society as a whole . ... Tite ~ goal c,( Title vii I& .. to 
make penons whole for Jnjurles suff«:R« on accGUDl or unlawful employmml cltsa1mtnaUon. -
Price Waterhouse u. Hopkfns. __ U.S. _ 109 S. Ct. I 715. 1798 ( 1989) IO"Connor. J .. roncumng tn thr judgmcntl fquoung from Albemarle J'uper- Co. u. Moody. 422 ll.S. 405. 417-18 ll 975U. 
15. Similarly. tn fashtonJ~ an appropriate award under Titlr Vll. some:: courts have deckkd that back pay ls taxallk income. See. e .g .. ,Johnston 11. Harris County nood C".onlrof , Jist .. 869 F.2d 156.5. J579-80(51hCiL 19R91. cert. denied. __ IJ.S.. -·HOS.Ct. -, .. ... ,,. .. ., . ··-





apply to any punttl~ d~ In connection wllh a 
rasr not inf'luctln~ phystral lnjnr-y or physk~I 
sicknes.-.: · Thts action Is significant to our analysis bnausc the ortgtnal bill lntroduttd in the House of 
lkpresentatlves would have limited the § 104(a)(2J 
t>xclus!on to c:IBeS !.m.-ot,.rtng physical injury or ph}-sic.al s1ckncs.~. As the Hol.U'le Ways and Means Commllltt explained the bUJ. ··some courts h~ hdd that the 
cxdusion appltts to damages In cases lnvolvtng t"mp]oyment dtscrlminatton ... but that Che ~commmtt 
believes that such t~tmenl Is tnapproprlatc whC":'n! no physical Injury or stclmrss ts Involved. - H.R. Rep. No. 
247, IOtst Ccmg .. 1st Scss. 1354-55. reprint1:'rl fn. 
1990 U .S. Code Cong. & Admtn. News 2824-2.5. The 
Senate bill contained no such amendment to 
§ 104(a)(2). In Its final confcrcntt btll. C'..ongress chose to impllctlly endor-sc the courts· expansive 
lnterprdalton of' ll l 04(a)(2) to encompass nonphysical 
injuries and merely ctrcumscrt~ the scopr of the exemption as lo only one type of remedy. i.e .. punitive'. damag~. and not other types of n:mNlies typically 
avatJ.1.Nt:" tn ~ploymn1t dtf.lC'Tfmlnatton ca.c;.es. such as 
back pay. H .R Conf. Rrp. No. 386. 101st Cong .• 1st Srss. 622-23, reprinted in. 1990 U.S. Code Cong. & 
Admln. News 3225-26. CJ. Lorfl.lan:f v. Pons. 434 U.S. 
575, 580 ( 1978) (''Congrea& Is presumed lo be aware of an admlnlst.rat~ or judicial lnterpretaUon of a statute 
and to adopt that Interpretation when lt re-enacts a statute wllhoul change ... , (citing ca!ICSt. 
Of r.ourse. it might be troubling to some": that a 
SUCL"C8Srul (NHUtlUT in a.u ADEA ~it wm make oui h,•ttrr, vi~-vi.c; fNlnal tnmm~ tax liahUify_ th~n ifth~ 
plaintiff had not been dl9l.Thnlnated agaim~I In the first place. Although this conCfftl Is understandable. we note lhat we ar-e simply followtng the Treasury regulation that injects Into the analysis tort and 
contrnct conc~ts. Moreover. the suc~s...~ruJ ADEA 
plaintiff Is bcl~ treated no better (or worse now) than 
2! 
fhr typicc1J t.ort vie(tm who suffers a physic.a! injury. 
See supm typescript p. 7. w~ Stt no reason to treat one 
personal injury victim any diflf:rr.ntly than another. 
See Miller u . Cornmisstone,.. 93 T .C. 330. 337119891 ttuJI Tax Court in a 9-1 decision S (""Section l 04 does nut distinguish bdwe«-n physical and nonphysical 
injuries. and WC sec no sound reason to const~ lhc sf.atutc In such a way a.-. lo not alTord llw. same tax 
lttalmcnt to recoveries for all t~ of"pcrsonal" Injury ~ardJcs..-. of consequence.··, (c-ltation omittal). •• 

















The taxp.lytt In this CIR also atgues that should 
we reverse the Tax Court and hold that the entire 
5"ttkmcnt ls eJCcludablc from gross ln~ome under 
fl 104(a)(2). we should a.l9o moonslder the Tax eourt·s 
declston not to aw:ird the taxpayer reasonable 
litlgatlon expenses under the Intern.al Revenue Code of 
1986. 26 U.S.C. A 7430. Slntt ~ ha~ reversed the 
Tax Court we have also considered this additional 
issue. Hownn. we do not believe the taxpayer- ls 
entitled to CJq)ftl9CS __ unc:1er_ the IRC. 
In ordrr- to reco,cr reasooablr litigation expenses 
undtt 8 7430. the taxpa}'ff must establish that he was 
the .. prevailing party.·· 26 U.S.C. I 7430(a). The 
statutory ddlnttJon or "~Wng party" Is a party who 
both ( l) "establlshe, that the position of the United 
States In the ctvll prncttdtng was not substantially 
jusllfled." 26 U.S.C. I 7430(c)(2)(AN017• and (2) "has 
substantially p.-evaJINI with RSpeCt. to the amount In 
controversy" or "has substantially prevailed with 
~peel to the most slgnlflcant Issue or ~l of issues 
presented.- 26 U.S.C. I 7430(cl(2MA)(tt)(I}. UU. We do 
not believe that the taxpayer has established 
requlremnlt ( 1 ). 
The Commissioner's principal position 
throughout t.hffle pf"O('ttdtnp has bttn that one-haU 
of the settlement ftgure was for back pay and one-half 
17. Pr-tor to lh.c 1986 amca1d1•1G1b.. the JRC ~•FNI a plainllff 
to show iJiai lhc g.,,,a• aaun1l·s lJlaNllUlli - -uu1eam.1wbk .. in 
ordu to~ considered a ··prevatllng pu1,.-· ""Thie t"ha~ 1or 
language from ·unreaso-ble" to ·not eubstantt.ally jusllflt:d"I 
apparently came about as part of an ullSUCtt8Sful effort by the 
S(:natc Flnantt CGmmlUft: to rnakt. t!ledlon 7"30 <'Ollfonn lo th" 
pttvalll~ tntn-prct.atlon of the Equal Ac:ttss to Justice Act ... by 
r"qulrtn,t the go•ernmcnt lo prove thal its poslllon was 
suhstanuallyjuallfk:d.-smllh v. Vn.ltmStales. 850 F.2d 242. 245 
n 815th C1r. 1968) fCIOphasjs tn the mlftlDal). ~ H.R Conr. Rq,. 
No. 8-41. 99th Con,t .. 2d Sc.s. 11-799-ll-BO'l. 1986 U.S. Code Cong. 
~ Mmln. Nc=ws 4887-90. 
2:J 
was rot Ji,4uidith:d dam.a~~. and tha1 bolh lypcs ol 
damages were taxable. Thr. C,ommissio~r a~ed that 
back JQY wa.c; taxable Income bct.c1usc il was paid on 
acr.onnt of a nonpr.rsonaJ ln_iury. Although ~ haw. · 
rejected that argument here. g,ven that the 
r..nmmlsslonr.r prevailed in the Tax Court on the Issue. 
that Byrne had not yd been dttided by this Court. the 
inconsistency we have found in IM Tax Court·s 
approach Su Hits issue. see supra n.5. and the 
assumplk>rt by many courts that sueh back pay awards 
aIT taxable. see supra lypescrtpl p.20. we think that 
the Commtssloncr·s position could be dttmed as 
n-.asonably supported tn the ~ law. See. e.g .• Smith 
u. United States. 850 F.2d 242. 246 (5th Ctr. 1988) 
(rcqutr-lng taxpayer- to prove that the govcm~t·s 
position was unjustified): Boalmen·s FfTSl Nall Banlc 
efKansasCityu. UnUedSlales. 7~JF.Supp. 163. 107 
(W. l>. Mo. 1989): Feldmar v. Commissioner. 56 
T.C.M. (CCII) 1414. 1416 (1989) f'ln determining 
whelhrr (the government's) position was not 
substantially justified. the question is one of wJJCther 
(the government·s1 position in I.he litigation was 
un.-casonabk. "). Cf. Pierce v. Underwood. 487 U.S. 
552. I 08 S. Ct. 2541. 2550 (I 988) (lnleq>rding the 
phrase ··substantially justified" fOI" purposes of the 
closely relalr.d Equal Attess to Justice Act to mean 
Justified to a degrtt that would saltsfy a reasonable 
pasonl. See genemlly Glesecke v. (Jnfled. Stales. 637 
F. SupJ). :109. 310-12 (W.D. Tex. 19861 tno difference 
belwttn ··substantially justified- lf'!St under EAJA and 
'"unreasonableness .. standard under the iRC or 19541: 
Ka14fman v. Egger. 584 F. Supp. 872. 877 n. I (D. M~. 
1984). cyf'd. 758 F.2d I (Isl CJ.-. 198.5) (sa~I-
Wc believe that the Commissioner's position that 
th~ portion of the settlement it vit'\ved as ltqutdatr.d 
damages was taxable js more pToblemattc. The 





























damages are punitive and. as such. are taxab
le income 
under § 61. ctttng ~ommtssfoner v. G(ensh
aw Glass 
Co .• 348 U.S. 426 {1955). Althouf,h the T
ax Court 
ultimately ttjected this argummt. 
11 for purposes of 
8 7 430 the Court found the Commis.stoner·
s position 
was .. sub6tantlally justlDcd. M App. at 508. Se
e PhlHlps 
v. Commf.ssfoner. 851 F.2d 1492. 1499 
(D.C. Ct.-. 
1988) (whethe.- the govemment·s po
sition Is 
substantially Justified must be determined b
y an the 
facts and circumstances and slmply bec
ause the 
government Jost In the Tax Court shou
ld not be 
dJsposltl'ff ). We do not bcHne that the Cou
rt abu..~ 
tts discretion to so finding. See Zln
ntel v. 
Commfsstoner. 883 F.2d 1350. 1354-55
 (7th Cir. 
1989); Berks v. Unll.ed. States. 825 F.2d 1
262, 1263 
(8th Ctr. 1987). Cf. Undenvood. 108 S. Ct. a
t 2546-49 
(deciding that the abuse of dtscretJon st
andard of 
r-evtew should be applied to the dgslrlc
l court's 
detenntnatlon of substanually justified und
er EMA). 
Unlike the FLSA. llqutdated da111ages arc 
not 
generally available to p!aJnttffs under· the 
ADF.A To 
recover such. the plainUfJ must establish
 that the 
employer wtllfully Violated the Act. 29 U.S.C
. § 626(b) 
( 1982). In discussing the statute·s w
illfulness 
standard. the Supreme Court has noted
 that the 
··1eglslaUve history or the ADEA indic
ates that 
Congress Intended for llqutdafed dama
ges to be 
punitive In nature.·· Trans Worfd AfrHne
s. Inc. t,. 
Thurston. 469 U.S. Ill. 125 (1985). 
Since the 
plalnUffs ~overy of liquidated damages Is not b
ased 
on tJie extent of the taxpayer·s Injury but in
stead the 
employer's degree of culpablltty. th
e Cour-t•s 
Interpretation of the legislative history 
seems lo 
I 8. We rc--nnphasltt that the Comnussto
ncr has not appealed 
this dt:c&slon so an we a.-t: deciding here Is whclhu lhc
 
Commlsslonu·s posll,lon was subst~nUal







comporl with the st.atutc·s slrudurc. Furthe
rmore. al 
least one court has rharclclerized llquidatt>d
 dama~es 
und('.T the ADI-:/\. as punitive. Kelly "· 
American 
Standard. Inc .• 640 F.2d 971. 979 (9th Cir.
 1981 ). CJ. 
Dreyer v. ARCO Chem. Co .. 80 l F.2d 651.
 6.57-58 (3d 
Cir. 1986). cert. denied. 480 U.S. 906 ( 198
7} (Jookjng 
to general punilive dama~e principles to dete
rmine the 
meaning of -wlllfulnt:s..-.- in the context of
 disparate 
treatment in a discrete employment situatio
n). 
Moreover. it was not unceasonable fo
r the 
Commissioner to have tntt>rprcted Glenshaw
 Glass as 
slanding for the proposition that aU punitiv
e damage 
awards are indudahle In gnx-;..,-. im:ome. All
hough the 
court In Glenshaw Glass was appattnlly co
nsidering 
only whether treble damages under the anti
trust laws 
~re taxable under the IRC. its langu~ w
as much 
broadt>Y-: .. Damages for personal injury are by
 definition 
compensatory only. Punitive damages. on 
the other 
hand. cannot be considered a restoration or eapilal for 
taxation purposes.·· Glcnshaw Glass. 348 l
J.S. at 132 
n.8. Both rour1s and commentators have
 gcnr.ralty 
Interpreted Glenshaw Glass as having enun
ciated the 
b.-oader proposition. See. e.g.. Tft
omson v. 
Commissioner. 406 F.2d 1006. 1006 (9t
h Cir. 1969): 
F'rolik. supra transcript p. 6, at 17-18.
19 
Thus. we hold that the CommL'isiom:r·s po
slUon 
that back pay and liquidated damages under
 lhe ADEA 
represent taxable Income was substantially
 justified. 
19. It I$ true that tn Scpten1bcr of 1989
. the Tax Court rk-t'ldcd 
that punitive darnaJ(rs were e.n-tudablc und
cr l041aM211r 11:ttivcd 
on a<'.'<:ount o( personal Injuries. Miller v. 
Cammisstone,._ 9:l T.C. 
:J."10 I I 009). Howcvn-. ~flller was dtcldr.d aftt
t <mr case. In addiUon. 
then• "·as a stron~ dlSSt'nl In Miller su
~cslin~. al kast. th(' 
rc·asonabk-n,·ss or 1hr Commls.'IIOl'l<'1··s positi
on In lhls n1~c. 
Wc notr also lhat Coflgr<"SS has now amcn
dt-d !l 104{alfl). ilmitinn 
the holdh~ of Mille, to puniliv<" dam.a~rs TC
l'O\-crt-d on ar"t·ounl ol 




















Therefore. we will affirm the Tax Court·s decision to deny the taxpayer's application for reasonable litigation expenses. 
IV. 
To summarize. we disagrtt with the Tax Court that half of the taxpayer's settlement. is taxable Income. Because age dlscrtmlnaUon 18 analogous to a personal Injury tort. all damages caused by t.hat injury are excludable under § 104(a)(2). However we do agree wtth the Tax Court that the taxpayer is not eoutled to reasonable litigation expenses since the Commtssloner·s posllton that the entire settlement amount repl"fflellted taxable Income was subslantlally justtRcd. Costs taxed against the appellee. 
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